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ABSTRACT
Let’s Plays and livestreams are popular online videos of
videogames being played. The Copyright Act protects
videogames as audiovisual works, and therefore provides
videogames with the exclusive right of public performance.
The Supreme Court issued a ruling in ABC, Inc. v. Aereo,
Inc. which clarified that performances in an online setting
can be public even if the individuals receiving the content
are doing so privately. However, the Court’s holding did not
provide guidance on who is a performer, and therefore is
liable for the infringing conduct, beyond the specific context
by which Aereo transmitted content to its subscribers.
Let’s Plays and livestreams are public performances of
videogames because they involve the playing of the
videogame and are made to be viewed by the public. There
are several categories of people who may be performers of
a Let’s Play or livestream: the creator of the video, the
poster of the video, the website that hosts the video, and the
person who causes the video to be played. The creator,
poster, and website hosting the video are all public
performers, and therefore are liable for the infringing
*
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conduct. However, the person who causes the video to be
played generally causes a private performance instead of a
public performance, and therefore is not liable for the
infringing public performance.
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INTRODUCTION
Videogames have moved from being solely a form of
entertainment enjoyed by people in private homes to widely
broadcast entertainment brought to a global audience through prerecorded Let’s Plays posted to websites such as YouTube and
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through livestreams posted to services such as Twitch.tv. 1 A Let’s
Play is a video of a player playing through all or part of a game that
may or may not have commentary.2 Videogames are not per se
copyrightable,3 but most easily meet the “modicum of creativity”
standard necessary to obtain copyright protection as audiovisual
works.4 One of the exclusive rights vested in videogames as
audiovisual works under 17 U.S.C. § 106 is the right to public
performance.5 In order to succeed in a claim for copyright
infringement, the copyright holder must assert he or she has a valid
copyright and show that one of the exclusive rights granted under §
106 has been violated.6 Let’s Plays and livestreams may violate the
public performance right, but the law is not entirely clear on this
matter.7 This is partially because determining who is a performer is
1

See The Evolution of Online Gaming, PC TECH MAG (May 17, 2018),
https://pctechmag.com/2018/05/the-evolution-of-online-gaming/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180517173542/http://pctechmag.com/2018/05/th
e-evolution-of-online-gaming/]; see Patrick Klepek, Who Invented Let’s Play
Videos?, KOTAKU (May 6, 2015), https://kotaku.com/who-invented-lets-playvideos-1702390484.
2
See
PC
MAG,
Definition
of:
Playthrough,
https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/66863/playthrough (last visited Feb.
13, 2019).
3
See Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir. 1982)
(explaining that a repetitive sequence of images in an audiovisual display is not
necessarily copyrightable if it amounts to an abstract idea or is not sufficiently
creative).
4
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
Videogames can also be protected as literary works (the source code) and musical
works (the soundtrack), but this Article focuses on videogames as audiovisual
works in order to analyze the public performance right. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106
(2012).
5
Section 106 (“[I]n the case of . . . motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly[.]”).
6
See id.; see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
7
See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“This case requires us to answer two questions: First, in operating in
the manner described above, does Aereo ‘perform’ at all? And second, if so, does
Aereo do so ‘publicly’?”). Let’s Plays and livestreams may constitute fair use of
a videogame, but that analysis is not undertaken in this Article. Compare Dan
Hagen, Comment, Fair Use, Fair Play: Video Game Performances and “Let’s
Plays” as Transformative Use, 13 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 245 (2018)
(concluding that Let’s Plays are likely fair use), with Elizabeth Brusa, Comment,
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difficult in the context of the internet and the identity of the
performer can affect whether or not the performance is public. 8
The Supreme Court provided some guidance as to streaming of
copyrighted content online in ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., but the
question of who is initiating the performance of a work, and
therefore who will be liable if said performance is public, is still the
subject of debate.9 Aereo concluded that both the service provider,
which provides television content through streaming, and the user
perform, but the liability of each party for public performance is not
settled.10 If the service provider initiates the performance, then that
performance at least has the potential to be public because that
performance may be transmitted to the public.11 Aereo only held that
service providers that behave like a cable television company can be
liable in this way.12
Let’s Plays and livestreams are undoubtedly performances of the
underlying videogame and are likely public performances because
they are transmitted to members of the public.13 Several parties
could potentially be liable for the public performance of the work,
either directly or indirectly, through a theory of vicarious or
contributory liability.14 If a party is a performer and the performance
is public, the party is directly liable for the infringement.15 The
creator is a public performer of a livestream or a Let’s Play if the
Professional Video Gaming: Piracy That Pays, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 217
(2015) (concluding Let’s Plays and livestreams are likely not fair use).
8
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2504.
9
See id. at 2510-11 (finding that Aereo performed the copyrighted works by
transmitting them to its subscribers but reserving the question of whether service
providers who do not behave like a cable company would be liable for direct
infringement).
10
See id. at 2506 (“[B]oth the broadcaster and the viewer of a television
program ‘perform,’ because they both show the program’s images and make
audible the program’s sounds.”) (emphasis in original).
11
See id. at 2510.
12
See id. at 2511.
13
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining performance of an audiovisual work
as “show[ing] its images in any sequence” and performing a work publicly as
transmitting a performance to “members of the public”).
14
See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
15
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012).
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creator intends the performance of the Let’s Play to be public. 16 The
poster of a Let’s Play or livestream and the hoster of a livestream
are public performers because the poster and the hoster are engaging
in the process by which the content makes its way to the public.17
The hoster is a public performer of a Let’s Play because the hoster
makes channels aggregating Let’s Plays available to the public like
a cable television company.18 The person who initiates the playing
of a Let’s Play or livestream is not a public performer because that
person’s conduct generally amounts to a private, rather than a
public, performance.19
Part I of this Article provides a brief introduction to statutory
copyright law and discusses the history of copyright law as applied
to videogames. Part II examines the bases of liability for copyright
infringement and explores the contours of the public performance
right. Finally, Part III finds that Let’s Plays and livestreams
constitute public performances of videogames. 20 This Article
concludes that the creator of the content, the poster of the content,
and the website hosting the content are all performers of the work
and therefore are directly liable for the public performance. The
initiator of the content is a performer but engages in a private
performance rather than a public performance, and therefore is not
liable for public performance.
I. COPYRIGHT LAW AS APPLIED TO VIDEOGAMES
Copyright law has existed since the Constitution was enacted
and is constantly being called upon to adapt to new forms of

16

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing the volitional act requirement as necessary for a claim of
direct infringement whereas the majority does not discuss volition).
17
See NFL v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding a public performance includes every step in the process by which a work
makes its way to the audience).
18
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511.
19
See id. at 2506.
20
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining public performance).
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expression.21 Videogames have come a long way since the days of
coin-operated arcade games, and an understanding of that history
allows for an appreciation of the culture surrounding Let’s Plays and
livestreams.22 Copyright law did not initially apply to videogames,
but copyright law has adapted to include this new technology. 23
A. A Brief Introduction to Copyright Law
The Copyright Act (the Act) defines what works are subject to
copyright protection, and what constitutes infringement, among
other things.24 A person who creates an original work of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium is entitled to protection of that work
through a copyright.25 Eight categories of works are eligible for
copyright protection, including audiovisual works, literary works,
and musical works.26 These works are fixed when they are embodied
in a medium of expression which is sufficiently permanent to allow
the work to be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated

21
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”).
22
See The Father of the Video Game: The Ralph Baer Prototypes and
Electronic
Games:
Video
Game
History,
SMITHSONIAN,
https://www.si.edu/spotlight/the-father-of-the-video-game-the-ralph-baerprototypes-and-electronic-games (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
23
See Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he
player's participation does not withdraw the audiovisual work from copyright
eligibility. No doubt the entire sequence of all the sights and sounds of the game
are different each time the game is played . . . . Nevertheless, many aspects of the
sights and the sequence of their appearance remain constant during each play of
the game.”); see also Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874
(3d Cir. 1982) (“The [videogame's] display satisfies the statutory definition of an
original ‘audiovisual work,’ and the memory devices of the game satisfy the
statutory requirement of a ‘copy’ in which the work is ‘fixed.’”).
24
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (2012).
25
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). In order to qualify for copyright protection, the
work must be either a literary work, a musical work, a dramatic work, a
pantomime or choreographic work, a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, a sound recording, or an architectural
work. Id.
26
See id.
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for a period of more than transitory duration.” 27
A copyright grants the author a bundle of exclusive rights that
vary depending on the work’s category.28 For example, all
copyrighted works have the right of reproduction, the right to
prepare derivative works, and the right of distribution, but the right
of public performance exists only in literary, musical, dramatic,
choreographic, and audiovisual works. 29 To succeed in a claim for
copyright infringement, the copyright holder must prove that he or
she holds a valid copyright and that one or more of the exclusive
rights was violated.30 A party can either be directly liable for
copyright infringement, or indirectly liable through vicarious or
contributory liability.31
A person is directly liable for copyright infringement if the
person violates any of the exclusive rights in a work with a valid
copyright.32 A person can be directly liable for copyright
infringement only if the person engages in some volitional conduct
with respect to the copyrighted work. 33 For example, a person who
causes a copyrighted movie to be played in a public park by setting
up the equipment, loading the movie, and pressing “play” violates
the public performance right of that movie.34 However, when more
than one party is involved in the infringing act, the question arises
as to which portions of the conduct are sufficient to hold that party
27

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
29
See id.
30
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
31
See id.; Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (explaining the doctrines of vicarious and contributory
liability). One scholar has argued that causal responsibility should also apply to
intellectual property, but this concept is not analyzed in this Article. See Dmitry
Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, 70 VAND. L. REV. 565,
572 (2017).
32
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
33
See, e.g., CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir.
2004); see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal.1995) (“Although copyright is a strict liability
statute, there should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking
where a defendant's system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.”).
34
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.08[C] (2018).
28
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directly liable for copyright infringement.35 A service provider who
fully curates the content it provides is directly liable for
infringement.36 Curation occurs when the service provider controls
what content it makes available to its subscribers, and selects and
arranges that content in a particular way.37 However, the level of
curation necessary to hold the service provider directly liable is the
subject of debate.38
A party can also be indirectly liable for copyright infringement
through either vicarious liability or contributory liability.39
Vicarious liability arises when a party has the right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity of another and has a direct financial
interest in that activity.40 Contributory liability arises when a party
has knowledge of the infringing activity of another and induces,
causes, or materially contributes to that infringement.41 For
example, a computer system operator is contributorily liable for
infringement if it has actual knowledge of specific infringing
content and continues to provide access to that content even though
simple measures could be taken to stop the infringement.42 Merely
35
Compare ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2513 (2014) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (describing video-on-demand service providers that curate the
content they provide as having the necessary volitional act required to hold them
directly liable for copyright infringement), with Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v.
CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining Cablevision’s
discretion in choosing the channels it provided was not sufficient volitional
conduct to hold it directly liable because Cablevision did not have control over
the content of the channels).
36
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2513 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Kimberlianne
Podlas, Linking to Liability: When Linking to Leaked Movies, Scripts, and
Television Shows Is Copyright Infringement, 6 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 41, 5859 (2015).
37
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Podlas, supra note
36, at 58-59.
38
See, e.g., Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 132 (holding Cablevision’s
discretion in choosing the channels was not sufficient control to hold Cablevision
directly liable because Cablevision did not have control of the content on those
channels).
39
See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
40
See id.
41
See id.
42
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir.
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linking to copyrighted content may be a sufficient basis for
contributory infringement, but that question has not been settled. 43
The invention of the internet along with the content hosting and
streaming of copyrighted materials to websites have made it difficult
to determine who is infringing a copyrighted work.44 The right of
public performance has a particularly difficult application to the
digital age because of the difficulty in determining who is
performing the work and whether that performance is public.45
Content hosting and streaming over the internet may or may not be
a public performance of a copyrighted work because this behavior
may be neither a performance nor public.46 The Act defines public
performance as
(1) to perform or display [the work] at a place open
to the public or at any place where a substantial
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a
family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a
performance or display of the work to a place
specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the
public capable of receiving the performance or
display receive it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same time or at different times. 47
Copyright law grants the owner of a copyright a bundle of
exclusive rights.48 If those rights are infringed, either directly
2007) (quoting A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir.
2001)); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
43
See Podlas, supra note 36, at 49.
44
See, e.g., ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2513 (2014) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (explaining that whether the defendant engaged in the act of
infringement is not usually an issue in a direct infringement case).
45
See id. at 2506 (finding that both Aereo and its subscribers perform).
46
See id. at 2511 (reserving the question of public performance for other
technologies until those technologies are before the court); see also Podlas, supra
note 36, at 58.
47
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
48
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
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through some act of volitional conduct or indirectly, the copyright
holder may bring a claim for copyright infringement.49 These
exclusive rights have been difficult to apply to new technologies. 50
In particular, the right of public performance has been difficult to
apply in internet settings including both hosted content and
livestreamed content, which videogames have ventured into through
Let’s Plays and livestreams.51
B. A Brief History of Videogames
While individuals play certain games by themselves, games
have been a social tool from the very start. 52 Whether it was card
games, board games, billiards, or eventually videogames, people
have used these games to interact with one another.53 With the rapid
advancement of the internet, computer games have progressed from
clunky games played on one physical machine to massive
multiplayer online experiences. 54 These social and technological
49

See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
50
See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982).
51
Compare Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121,
124, 140 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding a system that stored individual copies of
copyrighted works for subscribers did not violate the public performance right
because the subscribers were engaging in a private performance), with ABC, Inc.
v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2500-11 (2014) (holding an internet streaming
service that had individual streams for each subscriber was engaged in a public
performance of the copyrighted works).
52
See generally Gillian Orr, The Timeline: Board games, THE INDEPENDENT
(Aug. 31, 2011), https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/the-timelineboard-games-2346370.html (describing the first known board game as Senet, an
Egyptian game from 3500BC that required two players).
53
See generally id. (detailing the history of board games and all games
described require at least two players); see also The Rules of Billiards and
Snooker, MASTERS OF GAMES, https://www.mastersofgames.com/rules/billiardssnooker-rules.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2018) (describing billiards as requiring two
players); SMITHSONIAN, supra note 22 (describing Pong as the first commercially
successful coin-operated arcade game). While Pong did not require two players,
there is something inherently social about going to an arcade. See id.
54
See SMITHSONIAN, supra note 22; Brittany Vincent, A Brief History of
Online Gaming on the PC, PC GAMER (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.pcgamer.com/a-brief-history-of-online-gaming-on-the-pc/; see also
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advances have connected people all over the world with the
newfound ability to play a game with virtually anyone, anywhere. 55
Commercially available videogames began with coin-operated,
single-game arcade machines.56 These single-game machines made
their way into homes and were eventually replaced with multigame
consoles containing a slot for removable game cartridges that would
allow a user to build up a library of games and own only one
console.57 In early videogames, there was very little room for
players to modify the gameplay in any meaningful way.58 However,
a new subset of videogames now exists where the whole purpose of
the game is for the user to create his or her own new experience. 59

Riad Chikhani, The History of Gaming: An Evolving Community, TECHCRUNCH
(Oct. 31, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/31/the-history-of-gaming-anevolving-community/ (“The real revolution in gaming came when LAN networks,
and later the Internet, opened up multiplayer gaming. Multiplayer gaming took
the gaming community to a new level because it allowed fans to compete and
interact from different computers, which improved the social aspect of gaming.”).
55
See Chikhani, supra note 54 (explaining how massively multiplayer online
role-playing games (MMORPG) like Runescape allowed players from all over the
world to interact and compete through gameplay and a chat function).
56
See SMITHSONIAN, supra note 22.
57
See id. Early generation home game consoles, such as the Atari VCS (also
known as the Atari 2600), Mattel’s Intellivision, and ColecoVision, featured
interchangeable game cartridges that were retailed separately, instead of being
preloaded in the unit. See SMITHSONIAN, From Landfill to Smithsonian
Collections: “E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial” Atari 2600 Game (Dec. 15, 2014),
https://www.si.edu/object/landfill-smithsonian-collections-et-extra-terrestrialatari-2600-game:posts_a3b1fa93074f1c565e74f3dd968e1688. This advance
allowed users to build a library of games. See id. These initial consoles were a
flop and led to a crash in the early 1980s that was revived by Nintendo’s release
of the Nintendo Entertainment System. See id.
58
See, e.g., Pong: Electronic Game, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pong (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
59
See, e.g., What is Minecraft?, MICROSOFT, https://minecraft.net/enus/what-is-minecraft/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20181210044759/https://minecraft.net/en-us/whatis-minecraft/] (last visited Nov. 4, 2018) (emphasis added) (“There’s no one way
to play Minecraft. It’s an open-ended game where players decide what they want
to
do
by
themselves!”);
Super
Mario
Maker,
NINTENDO,
http://supermariomaker.nintendo.com/wii-u/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20181017172350/http://supermariomaker.nintendo
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One type of game that is currently increasing in popularity is a Battle
Royale game, wherein players are dropped on a large map with no
resources and fight other players to be the last one standing. 60 These
games are so popular in part because of the unpredictability of every
playthrough.61
The enhanced abilities of the internet also allowed people to be
involved in videogames in a new form through Let’s Plays and,
eventually, livestreams.62 Let’s Plays and livestreams are popular
online videos that feature a person or several people playing a
portion or the entirety of a videogame.63 A Let’s Play is a prerecorded video of one or more people playing a videogame that is
.com:80/wii-u/] (last visited Nov. 4, 2018) (describing the game with the tagline
“Anyone can make it. Everyone can play it.”).
60
See Phil Hornshaw, The History of Battle Royale: From Mod to Worldwide
Phenomenon,
DIGITAL
TRENDS
(Apr.
10,
2018),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/gaming/history-of-battle-royale-games/.
61
See id. (statement of Brendan Greene, creator of PlayerUnknown’s
Battlegrounds) (“I think, you know, especially with Battlegrounds, there’s no
right way to play it . . . . However you want to play it is up to you. It’s a challenge,
you know — it’s against other people. It’s not something you can predict, it’s
against another person, and I think those are the best kind of interactions.”)
62
See Who Invented Let’s Play Videos?, supra note 1(“Even though the term
Let’s Play has become a way of describing talking over a game, often from start
to finish, it began as a way of rallying people to literally play a video game
together.”) (emphasis in original). The origin of the term “Let’s Play” is debated,
but it can be traced back to 2005 with comment threads and screenshots of
gameplay in order to get people to play a game together. See id. The first Let’s
Play is often credited to Michael “slowbeef” Sawyer and can be traced to a thread
in 2004 wherein Sawyer posts screenshots alongside commentary and instructions
for how to play the game Metal Gear 2: Solid Snake on his website. See id.
63
See Ben Gilbert, Amazon's Streaming Service Twitch is Pulling in as Many
Viewers as CNN and MSNBC, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/twitch-is-bigger-than-cnn-msnbc-2018-2
(disclosing the average viewership on Twitch in January 2018 to be 962,000
people); PC MAG, supra note 2; Michael Sawyer, Three Reasons Streaming is
Replacing the Let’s Play Industry, POLYGON (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.polygon.com/2017/3/29/15087012/streaming-vs-lets-play-twitchyoutube (“Let’s Plays tend to be more curated experiences; there shouldn’t be a
lot of dead air. The videos are recorded in advance and edited to be watchable.
Streams happen live and don’t involve editing after the fact. For this reason they
tend to be a bit more exciting. You never know what’s going to happen, and you’re
watching it live with everyone else.”).
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heavily edited.64 In contrast, a livestream is a simultaneous
broadcast of one or more people playing a videogame that is not
edited after the fact.65
Let’s Plays and livestreams are broad umbrella terms
encompassing a variety of different types of videos and game
experiences.66 The videos as a class include a wide variety of content
as they feature games that are both new and old. 67 The amount of
creativity that goes into a video varies between the types of videos
as well as between the creators themselves. 68 Let’s Plays and
livestreams generally contain commentary, and they may or may not
feature video footage of the gamer on the screen superimposed or
alongside a video of the game itself being played. 69
64

See PC MAG, supra note 2; Sawyer, supra note 63.
See Sawyer, supra note 63.
66
See, e.g., Guide: What are eSports?, BBC (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/37773832 (describing eSports as the short
form for “electronic sports” wherein players play videogames against one another
in the same way teams play sports against one another); Jordan Maison, How
Walkthrough Videos Can Grow Your Gaming Channel, CREATOR HANDBOOK
(June 1, 2017), https://www.creatorhandbook.net/how-walkthrough-videos-cangrow-your-gaming-channel-e4d66e4e6c46/ (“Rather than only showcasing
gameplay, a walkthrough aims to teach viewers how to maneuver through various
stages of the game.”); Frequently Asked Questions, SPEEDRUNSLIVE,
http://www.speedrunslive.com/faq/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2018) (“Speedrunning is
nothing more than playing a game with the intent of completing it as fast as
possible. People speedrun to challenge themselves, to see a game pushed to the
limits, and to get extra replay value out of a game.”).
67
See, e.g., Let’s Play Retro Games!, Videos, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/user/nicktendowii/videos (last visited Nov. 3, 2018)
(listing all videos on the channel including Let’s Plays for Mega Man 2 and
Yoshi’s
Island);
Fortnite,
TWITCH,
https://www.twitch.tv/directory/game/Fortnite (last visited Jan. 9, 2020) (listing
all channels for the game Fortnite and citing the game as having more than 51
million “followers”).
68
Compare LetsPlay, Let's Play - Fortnite: Battle Royale - AH Live Stream,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ZJQzutxHww
(including video of player in lower left corner), with LetsPlay, Let's Play
Minecraft: Ep. 47 - Enchantment Level 30, YOUTUBE (Apr. 19, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9vifqDcxKYw&list=PL1cXh4tWqmsEQPe
LEJ5V3k5knt-X9k043&index=48 (including video of gameplay but no video of
player).
69
See Sawyer, supra note 63.
65
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Many videogame companies do not object to Let’s Plays and
livestreams because the videos are generally very good advertising
for the game itself.70 However, videogame giant Nintendo is
notoriously unfriendly to such videos.71 Nintendo’s original policy
was to place advertisements at the beginning of, next to, or near the
end of Let’s Plays of Nintendo copyrighted content with all of the
advertising revenue accruing to Nintendo.72 Nintendo then moved
to a less stringent policy called the Nintendo Creators Program,
wherein YouTube users had to register their channels or individual
videos containing content belonging to Nintendo.73 Nintendo then
70

See Company Let’s Play Policies, WHO LET’S PLAY,
http://wholetsplay.com/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20190219084041/http://wholetsplay.com/]
(last
visited Nov. 3, 2018).
71
See, e.g., Keza MacDonald, Nintendo Enforces Copyright on YouTube
Let’s
Plays,
IGN
(May
16,
2013),
https://www.ign.com/articles/2013/05/16/nintendo-enforces-copyright-onyoutube-lets-plays (“[T]his sets an uncomfortable precedent for Youtubers who
make their living from Let's Plays and other self-created game content: they are
now unlikely to feature Nintendo games, and if other publishers were to follow
suit it would be a monumental shake-up.”); Gavin Sheehan, Nintendo Still Going
After YouTubers With Copyrights Over Switch Content, BLEEDING COOL (Mar. 8,
2017),
https://www.bleedingcool.com/2017/03/08/nintendo-still-goingyoutubers-copyrights-switch-content/ (“For over three years now, Nintendo has
been one of the most aggressive content hunters on YouTube, demanding that
gamers and Let’s Players work with them and forfeit a portion of their received
income from videos using Nintendo-created content, or be subject to having their
content pulled due to copyright issues.”).
72
See Brian, Nintendo Responds to Concerns Over YouTube “Let’s Play”
Content
Claims,
NINTENDO
EVERYTHING
(May
15,
2013),
https://nintendoeverything.com/nintendo-responds-to-concerns-over-youtubelets-play-content-claims/ (citing Nintendo’s original response to questions about
Nintendo’s Let’s Play policy).
73
See Julia Alexander, Nintendo-Specific YouTube Channels May Feel
YouTube’s New Monetization Rules, POLYGON (Feb. 20, 2018, 9:38 AM),
https://www.polygon.com/2018/2/20/17031540/nintendo-youtube-creators.
Users must register either individual videos or full YouTube channels, enroll in
the YouTube Partner Program, and may only include content from an approved
list of games. See About the Nintendo Creators Program, NINTENDO,
https://r.ncp.nintendo.net/guide/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180909035932/https://r.ncp.nintendo.net/guide/
(last visited Nov. 3, 2018); List of Supported Games, NINTENDO,
https://r.ncp.nintendo.net/whitelist/
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received a portion of the advertising revenue rather than all of the
revenue as it originally demanded.74 If the users did not register with
YouTube, the users would be dropped from the Nintendo Creators
Program and would be ineligible to receive any advertising money
for their videos.75
As of late 2018, Nintendo once again changed its policy to allow
creators to monetize their videos according to methods specified by
Nintendo.76 This policy allows for creators to use Nintendo’s
content in videos.77 However, Nintendo only allows videos that
involve the creator’s own creative content and commentary and not
just gameplay footage.78
While Nintendo is the leading example of unfriendly conduct
towards Let’s Players, other companies also oppose the use of their
works in Let’s Plays or livestreams.79 Let’s Plays and livestreams
are particularly problematic for small videogame companies that
make games with a narrative storyline because Let’s Plays and
livestreams can effectively replace the videogame, and then the
company does not receive the necessary revenue to continue making
games.80 The reason for playing narrative games is to interact with
[https://web.archive.org/web/20181004140723/https://r.ncp.nintendo.net/whiteli
st/] (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
74
See Alexander, supra note 76.
75
See id.
76
See Nintendo Game Content Guidelines for Online Video & Image Sharing
Platforms,
NINTENDO,
https://www.nintendo.co.jp/networkservice_guideline/en/index.html (Nov. 29,
2018).
77
See id.
78
See id.
79
See Patrick Klepek, Not Every Developer Is Convinced Let's Play Videos
Are
A
Good
Thing,
KOTAKU
(Mar.
26,
2016,
9:00AM),
https://www.kotaku.com.au/2016/03/not-every-developer-is-convinced-letsplay-videos-are-a-good-thing/ (explaining that game developers who create
games with high narrative content are less likely to allow their games to be used
in Let’s Play videos because videos of the game effectively replace the market for
the game).
80
See Ryan Green, On Let’s Plays, THAT DRAGON, CANCER (Mar. 24, 2016),
http://www.thatdragoncancer.com/thatdragoncancer/2016/3/24/on-lets-plays
(“[F]or a short, relatively linear experience like ours, for millions of viewers, Let’s
Play recordings of our content satisfy their interest and they never go on to interact
with the game in the personal way that we intended for it to be experienced. If
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the story, and therefore videos that give away a substantial portion
or all of the story limit the revenue the company can receive from
this kind of game.81 Videogame companies struggle to speak out
against Let’s Plays or to receive revenue from Let’s Plays because
of the intense public backlash they face when they do. 82
For example, the developers of the game That Dragon, Cancer
were effectively forced to reverse their policy of issuing Content ID
claims for videos containing their game because of the intense
backlash from Let’s Players who make a living from their videos.83
The developers had to contend with making almost no money from
sales of the game because of Let’s Players giving away the content.84
The developers hoped to be able to continue their work from the
small amount of money they would receive from advertising and
donations.85
Courts and experts originally doubted whether videogames were
sufficiently fixed to be afforded copyright protection because,
unlike other audiovisual works like movies, videogames require
some participation from the players who slightly alter the output of

you compare the millions of views of the entirety of our game on YouTube to our
sales as estimated on SteamSpy, you can hopefully see the disparity.”).
81
See id.
82
See Not Every Developer Is Convinced Let's Play Videos Are A Good
Thing, supra note 79.
83
See id.
84
See id. (“Green [the designer] made an appeal for people to use That
Dragon, Cancer videos as a chance to share their personal stories. But more to
the point, he hopes they will encourage their viewers to support the developers,
so that they can make more games.”).
85
See id. (“The developers ‘underestimated how many people would be
satisfied with only watching the game,’ and became frustrated by the millions of
people watching the game on YouTube translating into zero revenue for their
years of work.”). Numinous Games (the studio that produced That Dragon,
Cancer) began production on another game called Untethered that subsequently
lost its funding. See Untethered Hiatus, NUMINOUS GAMES (Oct. 2, 2018),
http://www.numinousgames.com/blog/2018/10/2/untethered-hiatus. Numinous
Games recently announced that new funding has been secured for the project and
it will continue under the name AREA MAN LIVES. See Untethered is Back. With
a New Name on New Platforms, NUMINOUS GAMES (Feb. 10, 2020),
http://www.numinousgames.com/blog/2020/2/10/untethered-is-back-with-anew-name-on-new-platforms.
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a game each time they play.86 However, courts have clarified that
while player participation will modify a particular run-through of a
game, the underlying program is sufficiently fixed to warrant
copyright protection.87 Videogames can be protected by several
categories of copyright law including literary works (the source
code), musical works (to the extent that the music is an original work
of authorship), and audiovisual works (the sequential displays
created by the source code).88
As audiovisual works, videogames are granted the right to public
performance, which may be infringed by the rising trend of Let’s
Plays and livestreams.89 If Let’s Plays and livestreams constitute a
public performance, the copyright holder can have the videos
removed because the videos are infringing the copyright holder’s
exclusive right to public performance.90 However, when videogame
companies request that Let’s Plays and livestreams be removed, or
take advertising revenue from these videos, the companies receive
public backlash that can affect the sales of their games.91
II. THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT AND THE INTERNET
The development of the public performance jurisprudence is
imperative in analyzing whether Let’s Plays and livestreams violate
the public performance right. While the Act defines “public
86

See Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982).
See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir.
1982) (citing Stern, 669 F.2d at 855-56) (“Although there is player interaction
with the machine during the play mode which causes the audiovisual presentation
to change in some respects from one game to the next in response to the player's
varying participation, there is always a repetitive sequence of a substantial portion
of the sights and sounds of the game, and many aspects of the display remain
constant from game to game regardless of how the player operates the controls.”).
88
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). This Article focuses on videogames as
audiovisual works in order to analyze a violation of the public performance right.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
89
See 17 U.S.C. § 106. This Article does not address whether Let’s Plays and
livestreams are fair use of videogames. For an analysis of the fair use of Let’s
Plays and livestreams, see Brusa, supra note 8 and Hagen, supra note 8.
90
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
91
See Brian, supra note 72; Not Every Developer Is Convinced Let's Play
Videos Are A Good Thing, supra note 79.
87
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performance,” the application of this definition to different
technologies and situations has been challenging. Courts have
struggled both with what it means to perform within the meaning of
the Act and whether said performance is public. In order to be
directly liable for violating the public performance right, the actor
must have intended to perform and intended that the performance be
public.92 The invention of the internet and the increasing ability to
post and stream copyrighted content has posed additional challenges
to the courts in determining whether there was a performance,
whether the performance was public, and who is a performer. 93
A. What is a Performance?
The Act defines performance with respect to an audiovisual
work as showing the work’s images in any sequence or to make the
sounds accompanying the work audible by any device or process.94
However, if the images are shown in a nonsequential order the result
may be considered a display rather than a performance, and
therefore violates a different exclusive right.95 In the context of the
internet, there are four possibilities for when performance occurs. 96
These possibilities are when the content is created (assuming it is
ultimately uploaded);97 when the content is uploaded;98 when the

92

See CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004).
See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014).
94
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883
F.2d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1989).
95
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 2
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.14[B][[1] (2018) (“If the images are shown in
nonsequential order, then a ‘display,’ rather than a performance, occurs.”).
96
See Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2012)
(describing two possibilities for performance as performance by uploading and
performance by receiving). In the context of Let’s Plays, more possibilities exist
for performance because the potentially infringing content must first be created
and the website that hosts the content, such as YouTube, does not continuously
transmit the content to the receiver. See Sawyer, supra note 63. Therefore, the act
of receiving the content can be split into the act of hosting the content and the
receiver’s actions in causing the content to be played. See id.
97
See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
98
See Flava Works, Inc., 689 F.3d at 760-61.
93

92

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 15:2

content is transmitted;99 and when the recipient engages to receive
the content, for example by pressing play. 100 When content is
streamed, rather than prepared ahead of time, these categories can
collapse into two basic types: uploading and transmitting. 101
In NFL v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, the Second Circuit held
that a performance includes every step in the process by which the
work makes its way to the audience. 102 A video transmission of
copyrighted NFL games to be viewed in Canada was found to
infringe the public performance right even though the ultimate
performance was not within the United States and thus not subject
to the Act.103 The NFL games made their way to Canada through an
uplink to a satellite by defendants and a downlink to the
subscribers.104 The uplink of the broadcasts was part of a continuous
process that culminated in a public performance, and therefore the
defendant was found directly liable for copyright infringement.105
However, Primetime 24 does not address whether the uploading of
content would be a performance if the content was not directly
streamed to another party, for example if the content was uploaded
to YouTube.106
When content is not directly streamed to another party, not every
step in the transmission may count as a performance. 107 While a
user’s ultimate act of playing a song is a performance, the Second
Circuit found that the act of downloading a music file that could not
be played during the download was not a performance. 108 In that
case, the user would have to do something beyond initiating the
99

See id.
See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 132
(2d Cir. 2008).
101
See Flava Works, Inc., 689 F.3d at 760-61.
102
211 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2000) (“We believe the most logical interpretation
of the Copyright Act is to hold that a public performance or display includes ‘each
step in the process by which a protected work wends its way to its audience.’”).
103
See id.
104
See id. at 11.
105
See id.
106
See id. at 11.
107
See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, 627 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir.
2010).
108
See id. at 74, 85.
100

2020]

PUBLIC PERFORMANCE?

93

download in order to perform the song because 17 U.S.C. § 101
requires the transmission to be audible in order to be considered a
performance.109 Streaming the song would have been a performance
because the song would have been perceived by the subscriber as it
was transmitted.110
In Allen v. Academic Games League of America, an educational
board game manufacturer sued a competitor for violating his public
performance right by using his games in tournaments, and thereby
asked the Ninth Circuit to expand the definition of public
performance to include the playing of a board game.111 In copyright
terms, a board game is a pictorial work and possibly also a sculptural
work, and therefore is entitled to the bundle of rights associated with
those types of works which does not include the right of public
performance.112 The court held that playing a board game in public
was not a public performance under the Act because the term “play”
within the meaning of the Act was for music, records, and
audiovisual works, and did not extend to playing a board game. 113
Performance of a work includes every part of the process by
which the work makes its way to the audience when the work is
directly communicated to the audience as in through a livestream,
but performance may not include every step in a process where the
109

See id. at 73 (“Music is neither recited, rendered, nor played when a
recording (electronic or otherwise) is simply delivered to a potential listener.”).
110
See id. at 74.
111
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); Allen v. Acad. Games League of Am., Inc.,
89 F.3d 614, 615 (9th Cir. 1996).
112
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (2012).
113
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Allen, 89 F.3d at 616 (“The term ‘play’ has
not been extended to the playing of games.”). Unlike videogames which are
protectable as audiovisual works, board game copyright holders are not granted
the right to public performance. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). The court also said that
to allow the owner of a copyright in a game to limit where a purchaser could play
the game would put an undue restraint on consumers. See Allen, 89 F.3d at 616
(“Whether privately in one’s home or publicly in a park, it is understood that
games are meant to be ‘played.’”); Bruce E. Boyden, Games and Other
Uncopyrightable Systems, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 439, 475 (2011) (“[T]he rights
of public distribution, performance, and display regulate only the transmission of
works from one person to another, and not the experience of the work itself.
Games are meant to be played, and playing one does not violate any of the rights
of a game’s copyright owner.”).
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work takes several discrete steps on its way to the audience.114 The
work must be able to be perceived during the transmission in order
for the transmission to be a performance of the work.115 Determining
whether a work has been performed is only one part of the copyright
analysis.116 The work must also have been performed publicly in
order to violate the owner’s copyright. 117
B. What is Public?
The Act defines public as any place “open to the public” or
“where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of
a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.”118 A family within
this context includes a single person living alone, and therefore a
gathering including only that person and his or her social
acquaintances is appropriately private.119 The “open to the public”
language in the Act means it does not matter how many people
actually show up; what matters is that the public could show up. 120
The internet generally is open to the public absent some security
feature to keep the content private.121 Additionally, sometimes
public internet sites may not be open to the public in a copyright
sense because of the difficulty in navigating to them.122 For
example, a YouTube channel that is not private is likely open to the
public because anyone can navigate to the channel or its videos by
using keywords related to the content of the video.123 In contrast, a
public Dropbox is likely not open to the public because it is difficult
114
See Am. Soc’y of Composers, 627 F.3d at 85; NFL v. Primetime 24 Joint
Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2000).
115
See Am. Soc’y of Composers, 627 F.3d at 73.
116
See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
117
See id.
118
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
119
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 64 (1976) (“The term ‘a family’ in this
context would include an individual living alone, so that a gathering confined to
the individual’s social acquaintances would normally be regarded as private.”).
120
See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 95, at § 8.14[C][1].
121
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
122
See id. However, while public internet sites could potentially be open to
the public, the ability of the public to effectively access the work may make the
work unavailable to the public. See id.
123
See Podlas, supra note 36, at 76.
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to access outside a person’s family or social circle.124
The Act includes a clause within the definition of public
performance referred to as the “Transmit Clause.” The Transmit
Clause states that a performance is public if it is transmitted or
communicated to a place that is open to the public, or is transmitted
to members of the public by any means regardless of whether those
members are in the same place and whether they receive the
transmission at the same time.125 A transmission is still a
performance regardless of whether subscribers are operating their
receiving apparatuses at the time of the transmission. 126
Determining whether a transmission is to the public is difficult
in both the physical world and on the internet. 127 In the physical
world the courts have to interpret what the proper audience of the
performance is in order to determine whether the performance is
public.128 Whether transmissions to individuals over the internet
may be aggregated such that the overall performance is to the public
is the subject of debate.129
1. Performances in Semi-Public Settings
A public space in the copyright context does not necessarily
track the common conception of a public space. 130 While the Act
124

See id.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
126
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 64-65 (1976) (explaining it does not matter
whether members of the public actually receive the transmission, what matters is
that the public is capable of receiving the transmission).
127
See, e.g., ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2510-11 (2014)
(analyzing whether a television streaming service was transmitting to the public);
Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 157-59 (3d Cir.
1984) (analyzing whether private viewing rooms at a video store were open to the
public).
128
See Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 159 (holding the relevant place for purposes
of the public performance analysis was the entirety of the two stores, not the
individual viewing booths).
129
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510-11 (holding, implicitly, that individual
transmissions can be aggregated to a public performance because of Aereo’s
similarity to a cable television company).
130
See Redd Horne, 749 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[I]f the place is not
public, the size and composition of the audience will be determinative.”); Ackee
125
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does its best to define the meaning of public, new technologies can
stretch the definition and require the analysis of a court.131 Case law
is contradictory on whether places that can only be used by a private
party at any given time are open to the public within the meaning of
the Act.132
A video store was found to publicly perform when the
employees played a pre-selected videocassette from the front of the
store through circuitry to private viewing booths at the back of the
store.133 Each of the individual viewing booths held two to four
people, but the Third Circuit held the performance was public
because the relevant place was the entire store and not each
individual viewing booth.134 Another video store was found to
publicly perform when it rented out private viewing rooms to
patrons, and employees had no contact with the process. 135 The
Third Circuit held that even though the patrons loaded the videos
and pressed play, the video store was still a performer because it
provided the means of performance including the viewing rooms
and the equipment.136 The viewing rooms were open to the public
Music, Inc. v. Williams, 650 F. Supp. 653 (D. Kan. 1986) (“Moreover, the fact
that a club may be ‘private’ under state law is no defense to its public character
vis-à-vis the performance right under copyright law.”); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at
64 (1976) (“[P]erformances in ‘semipublic’ places such as clubs, lodges, factories,
summer camps, and schools are ‘public performances’ subject to copyright
control.”).
131
See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 63 (3d
Cir. 1986).
132
Compare On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F.
Supp. 787, 789-90 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding the transmissions of copyrighted
works to the hotel rooms was to the public even though the individual rooms were
private), and Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 157-59 (holding private viewing rooms in
a video store were open to the public because the proper audience is the entire
store rather than the individual rooms), with Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Prof’l
Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 279, 282 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that rental
of videos from the hotel gift shop to be viewed in the hotel room was not a
violation of the public performance right because the individual hotel rooms were
private places).
133
See Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 157-59.
134
See id. at 157, 159.
135
See Aveco, 800 F.2d at 61.
136
See id. at 62 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976)) (“In granting
copyright owners the exclusive rights to ‘authorize’ public performances,
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despite the fact they were only available to one person at a time. 137
In On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, a
system that allowed hotels to broadcast copyrighted works to guests
from a central repository was found to violate the Transmit
Clause.138 On Command’s system displayed a screen with a list of
available movies to hotel guests who then selected a movie to
view.139 The court held that the transmissions were made to the
public even though the individual hotel rooms were private because
the relationship between the transmitter and the guests was a
commercial or public one.140 However, the Second Circuit has
expressly rejected this contention because the language of the
Transmit Clause does not make a distinction between commercial
and non-commercial transmissions.141
The court in On Command Video Corp. implicitly held that the
use of the system across the aggregate of hotel rooms made the
Congress intended ‘to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory
infringers[]’ . . . . In our opinion, this rationale applies equally to the person who
knowingly makes available other requisites of a public performance.”).
137
See id. at 63 (“A telephone booth, a taxi cab, and even a pay toilet are
commonly regarded as ‘open to the public,’ even though they are usually occupied
only by one party at a time.”). Relatedly, a coin-operated videogame played by
multiple people was found to be performed publicly even though only one person
could conceivably play the game at a time. See Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v.
Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 278-79 (4th Cir. 1989).
138
See 777 F. Supp. 787, 789-90 (N.D. Cal. 1991); see also Warner Bros.
Entm't, Inc. v. WTV Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1006-07, 1010 (Cal. Central Dist.
Ct. 2011) (holding that defendant’s service of transmitting copyrighted DVDs to
its subscribers was a violation of the transmit clause and therefore the
transmission was to the public because the subscribers were members of the
public).
139
See On Command Video Corp., 777 F. Supp. at 788.
140
See id. at 790 (“[T]he relationship between the transmitter of the
performance, On Command, and the audience, hotel guests, is a commercial,
‘public’ one regardless of where the viewing takes place. The non-public nature
of the place of the performance has no bearing on whether or not those who enjoy
the performance constitute ‘the public’ under the transmit clause.”); see also
ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2508-09 (2014).
141
See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139
(2d Cir. 2008) (“If Congress had wished to make all commercial transmissions
public performances, the transmit clause would read: ‘to perform a work publicly
means . . . to transmit a performance for commercial purposes.’”).
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transmission public.142 The court reasoned that the guests’ volitional
conduct in selecting the movie and initiating the performance did
not affect the hotel’s liability for public performance. 143 Therefore,
the court held that the system itself had publicly performed despite
the fact the performance necessarily involved the volitional conduct
of hotel guests.144
Conversely, a hotel was found not to publicly perform
copyrighted motion pictures by renting copies to hotel guests for
viewing in their respective rooms.145 The Ninth Circuit held that this
was not a violation of the Transmit Clause because the copyrighted
work was not being broadcast from one location to another. 146 The
court reasoned that the individual hotel rooms were not open to the
public once they were rented, and the guests’ viewing of the works
was private because it was as though the guests were viewing the
works in the privacy of their own homes. 147
Whether the performance of copyrighted works to individuals is
a public performance has been the subject of debate. Some courts
have held that transmissions to individuals viewing in private
settings can be public because the aggregate of the transmissions is
to the public. Conversely, some courts have held that transmission
to individuals viewing in private settings are not public. The video
store and hotel cases concern the local performance of copyrighted
works, but what about the remote transmission of works, for
example via the internet?
2. Performances via Remote-Storage Digital Video Recorders
Cablevision developed a remote-storage DVR (RS-DVR) that
allowed customers to select television shows to be recorded that
were then stored remotely on Cablevision’s servers in individually
142

See On Command Video Corp., 777 F. Supp. at 790.
See id.
144
See id.
145
See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc., 866 F.2d
278, 279, 282 (9th Cir. 1989).
146
See id. at 282 (“A plain reading of the Transmit Clause indicates that its
purpose is to prohibit transmissions and other forms of broadcasting from one
place to another without the copyright owner’s permission.”).
147
See id. at 281.
143
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earmarked copies and played back at each customer’s request. 148 In
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., Cartoon
Network sued Cablevision on a theory of direct infringement of its
right of reproduction and right of public performance. 149 The court
held that the RS-DVR system did not violate Cartoon Network’s
exclusive rights.150 The Second Circuit’s holding with respect to the
public performance right was subsequently overruled by the
Supreme Court in Aereo.151
The Second Circuit examined the volitional conduct of
Cablevision in connection with its alleged violation of the
reproduction right.152 When comparing Cablevision to a copy shop,
the court concluded that there was a difference between the
volitional act of asking a person to make a copy and directing a
machine to make a copy because the person engages in the volitional
act of making the copy whereas the machine does not engage in any
volitional act.153 While Cablevision selected which channels were
available to its subscribers, Cablevision had no control over the
content made available on individual channels, and therefore was
not engaging in any volitional conduct with respect to the content of
the channels.154 The court found Cablevision’s practice of selecting
the available channels was not sufficiently proximate to the act of
copying to hold Cablevision directly liable for copies made by its
subscribers.155 The Second Circuit expressly declined to decide
whether there were cases wherein the defendant’s contribution
would be so great that it would be warranted to hold the defendant
148
See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124
(2d Cir. 2008).
149
See id.
150
See id. at 140.
151
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503, 2511 (holding Aereo liable for public
performance despite the fact that Aereo had individually earmarked copies of each
work for each subscriber); Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 139 (holding Cartoon
Network did not perform to the public because each RS-DVR transmission was
to an individual subscriber).
152
See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130 (explaining the infringement
analysis does not generally turn on whether the defendant engaged in the conduct,
but rather on whether the conduct was infringing).
153
Id. at 131.
154
Id. at 132.
155
Id. at 132.
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directly liable for violating the reproduction right; the court merely
decided Cablevision’s conduct did not go far enough in this case. 156
The Second Circuit did not determine whether the volitional conduct
test applies to the public performance right, but the dissent in Aereo
concluded that it does.157
3. Performances by Television Streaming Services
Aereo was a company that offered internet-based broadcast
television streaming services to its subscribers.158 Each subscriber
selected a show he or she wanted to watch, a subscriber-specific
Aereo antenna would find the show, the show would be saved to a
subscriber-specific folder, and the show was streamed to the
subscriber a few seconds behind the live broadcast. 159 The Second
Circuit found that Aereo was not performing publicly because each
stream was a private performance of a distinct copy earmarked for
each subscriber.160
The Supreme Court disagreed.161 The Court concluded that the
performance can be public whether the performance takes place
through one transmission or multiple transmissions. 162 The majority
156

Id. at 133.
See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2512 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 139.
158
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
159
See id.
160
See id. at 2504 (“In the Second Circuit’s view, Aereo does not perform
publicly within the meaning of the Transmit Clause because it does not transmit
‘to the public.’ Rather, each time Aereo streams a program to a subscriber, it sends
a private transmission that is avail-able only to that subscriber.”). This is
consistent with the Second Circuit’s opinion in Cartoon Network described above.
See 536 F.3d at 137.
161
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504 (“An entity that engages in activities like
Aereo’s performs.”). The subscriber also performs the work. See id. at 2506.
162
See id. at 2509 (“The Transmit Clause must permit this interpretation, for
it provides that one may transmit a performance to the public ‘whether the
members of the public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it . . . at
the same time or at different times.’”). The Court also makes a point to note that
it does not make a difference that Aereo was storing personal copies of the
program for each subscriber who selected it. See id. (explaining that each copy
contains the same work and therefore each transmission of a copy is a
performance of that work).
157
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drew parallels between Aereo’s system and community antenna
television (CATV) systems in order to reach this conclusion. 163
CATV systems were used to bring local broadcast television to
residents who could not otherwise receive the signals due to
technological constraints.164 The subscribers themselves could
choose which broadcasts to view, and the service provider did not
curate the content by choosing which content to broadcast nor
provide any original content.165 The Supreme Court held that such
service providers did not perform within the meaning of the Act, and
therefore the service providers did not infringe the broadcasters’
copyrights because the broadcasters, not the service providers, had
control over the content.166 However, the subsequent passage of the
Copyright Act of 1976 clarified that rebroadcasting content is a
public performance of that content.167 Aereo performed a similar
service to CATV systems because it brought the content curated by
broadcast television directly to subscribers. 168 The Court recognized
that the conduct of CATV providers and, by extension, Aereo, was
purposefully brought within the scope of the 1976 Copyright Act,
and therefore found Aereo infringed the public performance right of
the original broadcasters.169
The majority did recognize one difference between Aereo’s
service and CATV providers: CATV systems constantly broadcast
materials whereas Aereo only broadcasted materials at the request
of a subscriber.170 The majority decided that this difference was not
a major one because, even though the content was always available
in the background, the subscriber of CATV systems could change
163

See id. at 2511.
See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390,
391-92 (1968).
165
See id. at 392.
166
See id. at 400 (“If an individual erected an antenna on a hill, strung a cable
to his house, and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, he would not be
‘performing’ the programs he received on his television set. . . . The only
difference in the case of CATV is that the antenna system is erected and owned
not by its users but by an entrepreneur.”).
167
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2500.
168
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
169
Id. at 2511.
170
Id. at 2507.
164
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the channel to view different content similar to Aereo’s subscribers
selecting a particular program to record.171 Congress deliberately
brought CATV systems within the Copyright Act of 1976 despite
the contribution of the subscribers.172 The fact that the content in
CATV systems was always available to subscribers whereas the
content in Aereo’s system was not available until there was some
subscriber action was taken was not a meaningful difference to the
majority and therefore the Court found that Aereo performed. 173
Despite the fact that Aereo’s subscribers each received an
individual copy of a work, the Court decided that Aereo’s
performance was to the public because Aereo had the same
commercial objective as the CATV providers and Aereo’s
subscribers did not have a meaningfully different viewing
experience from the CATV subscribers. 174 The Court focused on
Congress’ intent to deliberately bring the conduct of CATV
providers within the Copyright Act of 1976, as well as the Transmit
Clause’s inclusion of performances via multiple transmissions and
to multiple places as infringing conduct. 175 Therefore, the Court
implicitly found that Aereo performed to the public through an
aggregate of private performances to individual subscribers. 176
The Court was careful to reserve the question of whether
technologies that do not behave like a cable television company
would infringe the public performance right.177 The Court’s holding
also did not extend to services wherein the subscriber “pays for
171

See id.
See id.
173
See id. (“But this difference means nothing to the subscriber. It means
nothing to the broadcaster. We do not see how this single difference, invisible to
subscriber and broadcaster alike, could transform a system that is for all practical
purposes a traditional cable system . . . .”).
174
See id. at 2508; On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
777 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that the transmissions were to
the public even though the individual hotel rooms were private because the
relationship between the transmitter and the guests was a commercial or public
one). Contra Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121,
139 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting a distinction between commercial and noncommercial transmissions in determining whether a performance is public).
175
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
176
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
177
See id. at 2510.
172
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something other than the transmission of copyrighted works, such
as the remote storage of content.”178 Finally, the Court specifically
mentioned cloud computing and RS-DVRs as technologies that do
not fall within its holding because those technologies were not
considered.179
Justice Scalia’s dissent argued that because the plaintiff
proceeded on a claim of direct infringement, it would have to prove
that Aereo—and not its subscribers—engaged in a volitional act of
performing the defendant’s work.180 A volitional act requires the
defendant to have done something that infringes the plaintiff’s
copyrighted material; in this case, the defendant must be the one to
perform the material.181 One example of volitional conduct would
be when a video-on-demand service selects and arranges content to
be viewed by its subscribers.182 The dissent concluded that in
Aereo’s case the subscribers were the ones engaging in infringing
conduct by choosing the content and activating the service, and
therefore, Aereo should not have been held directly liable for the
copyright infringement.183 This approach would not fully absolve
Aereo from liability, but would force the plaintiff to proceed on a
claim of contributory infringement in order to find Aereo liable for
178

See id. at 2511.
Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Aereo did not decide
whether Cablevision’s conduct was a public performance, but did overrule the
Second Circuit’s holding that Cablevision’s performance was not public. See id.
(declining to extend its holding to remote storage DVRs but concluding that
transmission to individually earmarked copies is insufficient to make a
performance private); Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding
the transmission of a remote storage DVR were private rather than public).
180
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181
See id.
182
See id. at 2513.
183
See id. at 2513-14 (“The key point is that subscribers call all the shots:
Aereo’s automated system does not relay any program, copyrighted or not, until
a subscriber selects the program and tells Aereo to relay it. Aereo’s operation of
that system is a volitional act and a but-for cause of the resulting performances,
but, as in the case of the copy shop, that degree of involvement is not enough for
direct liability.”); see also MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 960
(2014) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he producer of a technology which permits
unlawful copying does not himself engage in unlawful copying.”) (emphasis in
original).
179
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the volitional conduct of its subscribers.184
The meaning of public performance evolved by court
determinations of what it means to perform and what it means to be
public in specific contexts with new technologies.185 While Aereo
clarified the liability for public performance of copyrighted works
by service providers that behave like cable television companies, the
liability for other parties is still not clear. 186 This leaves room for an
analysis of the liability that should be imposed for new applications
of copyright law, such as Let’s Plays and livestreams.
III. LET’S PLAYS AND LIVESTREAMS AS PUBLIC PERFORMANCES
AND LIABILITY FOR THAT INFRINGEMENT
An analysis of whether a given situation is a public performance
of a copyrighted work involves both case law and the definition set
forth in 17 U.S.C. § 101.187 Let’s Plays and livestreams are public
performances of videogames, but the question of who is performing
the work is not settled.188 The creator of the video, the person who
posted the video (the poster), the website hosting the video (the
hoster), and the person who initiates the playing of the video (the
initiator) may all be performers and may either be directly or
indirectly liable for the infringement. 189

184

See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154,
157-59 (3d Cir. 1984).
186
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511.
187
See surpa note 47 and accompanying text.
188
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511 (“[W]e have not considered whether the
public performance right is infringed when the user of a service pays primarily
for something other than the transmission of copyrighted works, such as the
remote storage of content. . . . We cannot now answer more precisely how the
Transmit Clause or other provisions of the Copyright Act will apply to
technologies not before us.”); Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he question
is who does the performing. . . . If Aereo’s subscribers perform but Aereo does
not, the claim necessarily fails.”).
189
See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
185
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A. Let’s Plays and Livestreams are Public Performances of
Videogames
The Act defines performance for audiovisual works as to show
its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying the
work audible.190 Any of the various forms of Let’s Plays and
livestreams would fit into this definition because a foundational
requirement of such videos is to show the videogame being
played.191 However, only public performances of copyrighted works
are prevented by the Act.192
A performance is public within the meaning of the Act if it is in
a place open to the public, if it is in a place where a substantial
number of persons are present, or if it is transmitted to members of
the public regardless of whether those members receive the
transmission in the same place or at the same time.193 A livestream
is undoubtedly a public performance because the playing of the
videogame is being simultaneously broadcast to the public.194
Additionally, eSports, a subcategory of livestream wherein players
play a videogame against one another, are played in front of a live
audience, and therefore are also public performances of the
videogame.195
Let’s Plays are public performances within the Transmit Clause
because they are performances of videogames which are
communicated to viewers who are members of the public and who
may view the performances at the same time or at different times. 196
A string of cases has found that a performance can still be public
even if the viewers are receiving the performance in private
places.197 Courts have found that performances in settings that
190

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
See Who Invented Let’s Play Videos?, supra note 62.
192
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
193
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
194
See id.
195
See id.; Guide: What are eSports?, supra note 66.
196
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
197
See, e.g., ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2498, 2503, 2511 (2014);
Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 157, 159 (3d Cir.
1984); On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787,
789-90 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
191
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would generally be considered private, such as semi-private viewing
rooms in a video store and hotel rooms, are public within the
meaning of the Act because the aggregate of performances in these
private places is a public performance. 198 Therefore, a performance
of a Let’s Play is public even though the recipients are generally
viewing the content in their private homes with a small enough
group of people that the performance would otherwise be private
because the aggregate of the performances is public.199
One court held that the viewing of copyrighted works in hotel
rooms was not a public performance of the work even though the
hotel rented physical copies of the works to the guests.200 This case
can be distinguished from the others which found the transmission
of the work was a public performance because there was no central
repository from which the audiovisual works were being transmitted
to the viewers.201 In the case of both a Let’s Play and a livestream,
the content is being sent to the viewer by one broadcasting entity,
akin to a central repository, and therefore the performance is public
rather than private.202 Let’s Plays and livestreams are public
performances of videogames, and therefore one or more parties is a
performer and is liable for that infringement. 203
B. Liability for the Public Performances of Let’s Plays and
Livestreams
Several parties may rightfully be performers of the underlying
videogame, and therefore liable for the infringement caused by Let’s
Plays and livestreams. The creator of the Let’s Play or livestream,
the poster of the content, the hoster of the content, and the initiator
198

See Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 157, 159; see also On Command Video Corp.,
777 F. Supp. at 789-90.
199
See 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511.
200
Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc., 866 F.2d 278,
279, 282 (9th Cir. 1989).
201
Compare id. (holding that viewing videos rented from a hotel gift shop to
view in individual hotel rooms was not a public performance), with On Command
Video Corp., 777 F. Supp. at 789-90 (holding that videos sent from a central
repository to individual hotel rooms was a public performance).
202
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503, 2511.
203
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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of the content may all be said to be liable in different ways. One
party may fit into more than one category of actor; for example, the
same party may be both the creator and the poster.204 However, this
analysis splits the potential infringers into these four categories in
order to analyze the level of responsibility that should be assigned
to each type of conduct.
1. The Creator of the Let’s Play or Livestream
The creator of the Let’s Play or livestream is undoubtedly
performing the work by playing the videogame because the creator
is causing the images of the videogame to be displayed or is making
the sounds accompanying the videogame audible.205 The question
becomes whether the creator is performing to the public.206 If the
performance is public, the creator would have to intend for the
performance to be public in order to be held directly liable for the
infringement because that intention is the volitional conduct that
supports direct infringement.207 For example, assume a person was
playing a videogame in his or her apartment and was not recording
his or her playthrough, but someone else was standing across the
street and recorded the player’s playthrough using a telephoto
lens.208 If the recording subsequently ends up on YouTube, the
player cannot be held liable for public performance of the
videogame because the player did not have any volitional conduct
in making the playthrough public; the player did not cause or intend
the performance to be public.209 The same analysis stands if the
bystander is livestreaming the player’s playthrough rather than
posting it after the fact.210
204

See Let’s Play – Fortnite: Battle Royale – AH Live Stream, supra note 68.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
206
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
207
See CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004);
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there
should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a
defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.”).
208
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
209
See CoStar Grp., 373 F.3d at 550.
210
See id.
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A livestream is a performance to the public by definition because
the player is playing the game in front of a live audience either in
person or over the internet, just like when a performer plays a
musical work or acts in a play.211 The creator knows and intends that
the livestream is made available to the public, and therefore the
creator has the volitional conduct necessary to hold the creator liable
for direct infringement of the public performance right. 212 The
Transmit Clause further clarifies that it makes no difference whether
the audience is gathered in one place or is viewing the transmission
from different locations.213
Whether a Let’s Play is a public performance is an inherently
more difficult question because a Let’s Play is generally recorded
ahead of time and edited before it is posted. As such, the creator may
not have the necessary volitional conduct to hold him or her directly
liable because the content is not initially performed in front of the
viewers.214 The mere act of editing a playthrough of a videogame is
insufficient volitional conduct for a public performance because the
creator may intend to only view the content privately or to only show
it to people inside of the creator’s family and social circle. 215 Aereo,
Cartoon Network, and On Command Video Corp. all address
whether a commercial objective is sufficient to hold a broadcaster
directly liable for infringing the public performance right. 216 These
211

See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2512-13 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
213
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
214
See NFL v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2000).
This case involved the transmission of NFL broadcasts via satellite and therefore
had a different process than for Let’s Plays. See id. at 11.
215
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
216
Compare Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508-09 (holding Aereo liable in part
because Aereo shared the same commercial objective as community antenna
television providers), and On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
777 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“[T]he relationship between the
transmitter of the performance, On Command, and the audience, hotel guests, is
a commercial, ‘public’ one regardless of where the viewing takes place. The nonpublic nature of the place of the performance has no bearing on whether or not
those who enjoy the performance constitute ‘the public’ under the transmit
clause.”), with Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121,
139 (2d Cir. 2008) (“If Congress had wished to make all commercial
212
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cases do not address the situation particular to a Let’s Play where
the liability of the creator of the content is at issue.217 However,
creating the videos for the purpose of making them available to the
public is a commercial objective because generally the creators
receive compensation in the form of advertising revenue.218
Therefore the creator is a performer and can be held directly liable
for the infringing public performance. 219
Under Primetime 24, a public performance includes every step
in the process by which a work makes its way to the public. 220 That
case involved the direct transmission of works to the audience via
satellite which is distinguishable from Let’s Plays that are edited
before they are uploaded.221 However, creating a Let’s Play is the
first step in the process by which the Let’s Play reaches the audience,
and therefore the creator is liable as a public performer. 222
In the event the creator cannot be held directly liable for the
public performance, the creator may be held liable through vicarious
liability or contributory liability. 223 Vicarious liability requires the
right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and a direct
financial incentive in the infringing activity. 224 Therefore, the
creator would have to be compensated for his or her work in order

transmissions public performances, the transmit clause would read: ‘to perform a
work publicly means . . . to transmit a performance for commercial purposes.’”).
217
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503 (assessing the liability of an internet video
streaming service); Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 123-24 (assessing the liability
of a remote storage DVR system); On Command Video Corp., 777 F. Supp. at 788
(assessing the liability of an on-demand video streaming service for hotels).
218
See Alexander, supra note 73. Generally, the creator and the poster are the
same entity, but the poster would have to compensate the creator in some way if
they were different entities and therefore the creator has a commercial objective
regardless. See Let's Play – Fortnite: Battle Royale – AH Live Stream, supra note
68.
219
See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting); CoStar Grp., Inc.
v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004).
220
See NFL v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2000).
221
See id. at 11; Sawyer, supra note 63.
222
See Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d at 13.
223
See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
224
See id.
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to be held vicariously liable for the infringement.225 The creator has
the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity in one sense
because the creator made the infringing video with the intention that
the video be made public.226 Alternatively, the creator does not have
the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity because the
creator does not make the Let’s Play or livestream available to the
public; the poster does.227 Therefore, the creator cannot be held
vicariously liable for the public performance.228
Contributory liability requires knowledge of the infringing
activity of another and inducement, causation, or material
contribution to that infringement.229 The creator is undoubtedly
materially contributing to the infringement by creating the Let’s
Play or livestream.230 If the creator had the intention that the video
become publicly available, then the creator likely had knowledge of
the infringing activity of another in causing the performance.231
However, the creator may not be said to have knowledge of the
infringing activity because it has not happened yet. 232 Therefore, the
creator can only be held contributorily liable after the Let’s Play or
livestream is made public and the creator has knowledge of the
public nature of the video.233
The creator is a public performer of the underlying videogame
because the creator plays the videogame and intends the Let’s Play
or livestream to be public.234 Therefore, the creator is subject to

225

See id.
See Who Invented Let’s Play Videos?, supra note 62.
227
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
228
See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.
229
See id.
230
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991);
Sawyer, supra note 63 (explaining that both Let’s Plays and livestreams involve
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direct liability for the infringement.235 The next step in the process
by which the Let’s Play or livestream reaches the audience is the
posting of the video.236
2. The Poster of the Let’s Play or Livestream
The poster is directly responsible for making the infringing
content available to the public if the website the content was posted
to is open to the public.237 The poster will generally make content
from the same creator or content containing the same videogame
available on a specialized channel, on YouTube for example.238
However, making content available to the public is different from
performing the work publicly.239
The Act defines perform as “to recite, render, play, dance, or act
[a work], either directly or by means of any device or process or, in
the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its
images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it
audible.”240 The poster does not perform the videogame because he
or she is not playing the videogame, and is not otherwise causing
the videogame’s images to be displayed or making its sounds
audible.241 However, the court in Primetime 24 held that each step
in the process by which a work makes its way to the audience is a
public performance.242 That case involved a transmission of NFL
235
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broadcasts to Canada from the United States via a satellite. 243
In the case of a livestream, the poster could be held directly
liable for the performance of the creator because the posting of the
content is an integral part of the process by which the livestream
makes its way to the audience.244 A Let’s Play is distinguishable
from the circumstances in Primetime 24 because a Let’s Play is
played, edited, posted, and viewed in discrete steps rather than as
one continuous transmission of the underlying work.245 However,
Primetime 24 does not state that its holding applies only to
livestreams, and instead says that it was the intent of Congress that
public performance involves every step in the process by which the
work makes its way to the audience.246 Therefore, the poster also
performs a Let’s Play by being part of the process by which the
audience receives the work.247
The poster is a perfect example of vicarious liability for the
conduct of the creator.248 The poster has the right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity of the creator by choosing whether
or not to post the infringing content.249 The poster would have a
financial incentive in the infringing activity because the poster
would receive the advertising revenue from the video. 250
The poster can also be contributorily liable for the conduct of the
creator.251 The poster must have knowledge of the infringing content
of the creator because the poster is taking that content and making it
available to the public.252 The poster materially contributes to the
infringement of the creator by making the Let’s Play or livestream
available to the public.253 While the creator can be held directly
liable because of his or her intention to publicly perform the
243
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videogame, the game is not publicly performed until members of the
public view the transmission.254 The only way the work is publicly
performed is through the poster’s volitional conduct of posting the
video, and therefore the poster contributes materially to the creator’s
infringement and is contributorily liable for public performance. 255
The poster is a performer of the underlying videogame because
posting the video is a part of the process by which the Let’s Play or
livestream reaches the audience. 256 Therefore, the poster is directly
liable for the infringing public performance.257 The next party in the
process by which a Let’s Play or livestream reaches its audience is
the hoster.
3. The Hoster of the Let’s Play or Livestream
The hoster can be one of a variety of different types of websites
which have different aspects that affect the application of the public
performance right.258 A website that merely hosts content is not
liable for the public performance of the work because further action
needs to be taken in order to perform the work. 259 These types of
websites are analogous to the websites hosting music in United
States v. American Society of Composers, which were held not to
publicly perform music that was downloaded from the websites
254
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because the music was not able to be played during the download. 260
If the website does not have some sort of playback mechanism to
play the Let’s Plays or livestreams, then the website cannot be
directly liable for public performance because the website is not
performing.261 However, websites like YouTube that provide a
playback mechanism for videos are performing the works by
providing the means through which the works are performed. 262
Additionally, the hoster can either be public or private, but the
hosters of Let’s Plays and livestreams are public as the purpose of
the videos is to be seen by the public.263
A hoster curates content by selecting and arranging which
content is available to its subscribers. 264 For example, a hoster can
choose whether to allow content from certain creators or content
from certain videogames.265 If a hoster curates the content available
on its service, the hoster is directly liable for copyright
infringement.266 The hoster in this instance would have the
necessary volitional conduct to merit holding the hoster directly
liable because the hoster is choosing the content to include on its
service.267 Therefore, a hoster that curates content is directly liable
for the infringement regardless of the conduct of its subscribers. 268
In Primetime 24, the court held that every activity in the chain
of conduct by which a copyrighted work reaches its audience is a
public performance of that work.269 Therefore, the uplink of a video
transmission in the United States was held to violate the public
performance right of the NFL’s broadcasts even though the viewers
were in Canada where the Act does not apply. 270 Under this
framework, hosters that are hosting livestreams are liable for the
260
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public performance of the underlying videogames because the
hoster is an integral part of the process by which the livestream
makes its way to the audience. 271
However, Primetime 24 involves a continuous transmission
unlike Let’s Plays where the process involves several disjointed
steps of creating, posting, hosting, and receiving.272 If the court’s
analysis is taken on its face, the hoster is liable for public
performance by hosting the Let’s Play because hosting the content
is part of the process by which the work reaches the audience.273
However, the hoster may not know that it is part of the process by
which a given Let’s Play reaches its audience.274 Therefore, the
hoster cannot be held directly liable for the public performance
under Primetime 24 because the hoster is not knowingly engaging
in the process of transmitting the Let’s Play. 275
Under Aereo, a service provider that brings the content curated
by a broadcast cable company to subscribers is liable for infringing
the public performance right of the works contained in the stream
because the service provider is behaving like a cable television
company.276 The Court found Aereo liable for violating the public
performance right because Aereo’s practice of re-broadcasting
television content was the same as the CATV companies who rebroadcasted the signals of cable companies to people outside of the
service area.277 The conduct of the CATV companies was brought
explicitly within the Copyright Act of 1976, and therefore Aereo
was liable for engaging in the same type of conduct.278 This conduct
is very similar to a hoster that hosts livestreams, and therefore the
hoster is directly liable for infringement. 279
A hoster that hosts Let’s Plays can be said to behave like a cable
271
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television company because they are re-broadcasting someone
else’s content.280 The creator’s content is generally aggregated in
one channel just like on cable television, and therefore the entirety
of a hoster such as YouTube behaves like a cable television
company.281 Therefore, the hoster should be held directly liable for
the public performance of the videogames. 282
The hoster is not subject to vicarious liability for the public
performance.283 While the hoster is in the best position to know the
content posted on its service generally, the hoster should not be
responsible for the content posted by all of its users unless it is made
aware of infringing content by the copyright holder.284 Holding the
hoster vicariously liable for the public performance of Let’s Plays
and livestreams is improper because the hoster does not bear the
responsibility of ensuring that all content posted by users is
proper.285 In the context of videogames, the hoster would have to
keep apprised of which companies allow Let’s Plays and livestreams
for which games and would have to filter that content out in
removing infringing content.286
The hoster is not subject to contributory liability for the
infringement.287 The hoster cannot be said to have knowledge of the
280
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infringing activities of its subscribers, and therefore cannot be held
contributorily responsible for infringement.288 The mere fact that the
hoster’s service may be used for infringing purposes is not enough
to impute knowledge of those infringing uses and hold the hoster
liable for all infringement.289
The hoster is a performer of a videogame if it has knowledge of
the Let’s Play or livestream and has a playback mechanism because
the hoster is knowingly engaging in the process by which the video
reaches its audience.290 Additionally the hoster is a performer of a
videogame without knowledge because it behaves like a cable
television company.291 Therefore, the hoster is directly liable for
infringing the public performance right. 292 The final step in the
process by which a Let’s Play or livestream reaches its audience is
through the initiator.293
4.

The Initiator of the Let’s Play or Livestream

Aereo made it clear that both the service provider and the user
perform.294 Initiators are generally engaging in a private
performance when they press play on an infringing video to view in
their own home, and therefore cannot be liable for violating the
public performance right.295 If the initiators cause the content to be
played in a public place or cause it to be transmitted to the public,
then they can be directly liable for infringing the copyright holder’s
right of public performance.296 For example, if the initiator caused
the work to be played in a movie theatre, the initiator would be
288
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responsible for a public performance of the work because the
initiator would be playing the work to the public. 297
Initiators engage in the volitional conduct necessary to be
performers of a Let’s Play or livestream by pressing play on the
video or otherwise engaging with the content and causing it to be
played through some other mechanism.298 However, initiators
generally do not engage in volitional conduct relating to the public
nature of the performances.299 Therefore, the initiators cannot be
held directly liable for the public performance of the videogames
because the initiators do not intend to effectuate a public
performance when they press play on a video. 300
Let’s Plays and livestreams are designed to be public
performances of videogames because they are performances of
videogames and are made to the public either after editing or as the
performance is happening.301 The creator of a livestream is a public
performer and is directly liable for the infringement because he or
she is transmitting a performance of the videogame in real time.302
The creator of a Let’s Play is a public performer of the videogame
only if he or she intends the video to be public because Let’s Plays
are not publicly performed as they are created. 303 The poster of a
Let’s Play or livestream and the hoster of a livestream are public
performers of the work because the poster and hoster are part of the
process by which the work makes its way to the audience.304
However, the hoster of a Let’s Play is a public performer because
the hoster curates channels containing the videos and makes those
channels available to the public like a cable television company. 305
Finally, the initiator of the Let’s Play or livestream is not a public
performer of the videogame, unless the initiator plays the work in a
public place or transmits the content to members of the public,
297
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because the initiator generally engages in a private performance of
the work.306
CONCLUSION
Let’s Plays and livestreams are generally public performances
of videogames because they are recordings of the videogame being
played and the purpose of creating a Let’s Play or livestream is for
it to be seen by others.307 The creator of a livestream is a public
performer.308 The creator of a Let’s Play is a public performer if the
creator intends the performance to be public.309 The poster of a Let’s
Play or a livestream and the hoster of a livestream is a public
performer because the poster and hoster are engaging in the process
by which the content makes its way to the audience. 310 The hoster
of a Let’s Play is a public performer of the underlying videogame
because the hoster makes channels of Let’s Plays available to the
public in a similar fashion to a cable television company. 311 Finally,
the initiator of a Let’s Play or livestream is not a public performer
because the initiator’s conduct effectuates a private rather than a
public performance.312
Ultimately, assigning liability for public performance to
creators, posters, and hosters does little to alleviate the burden Let’s
Plays and livestreams can create on videogame developers. 313 The
public attitude favoring Let’s Plays and livestreams essentially
requires developers to allow their games to be used in order to avoid
backlash.314 If attitudes shift, videogame developers can use this
liability schema to prevent their videogames from being exploited
in Let’s Plays and livestreams without their permission. 315
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